Introduction
Besides transferring funds when countries do not have access to private capital, lending from multilateral development banks (MDBs) is supposed to contribute to building infrastructure, institutions and public policy in developing countries. 1 The not-for-profit and multilateral nature of these lending institutions has some distinct advantages in comparison to private lenders and bilateral agencies: these agencies have access to a wealth of information on developing countries that can be useful for investors undertaking new investments in a developing country; they also provide a unique forum for international policy coordination, and if necessary, for designing and exercising policy conditionalities in a borrower country. It is expected, therefore, that multilateral lending should encourage private flows to developing countries.
Some authors have found empirical support for this view. 2 For example, Kharas and Shishido (1991) found that during 1974-85, by alleviating credit rationing and improving creditworthiness (by increasing international reserves, for example), official aid was able to generate spillover effects that attracted private flows. A recent study of aid-recipient countries in Africa estimated that in countries with good economic management, one percent of GDP in foreign aid increased private investment an extra 1.9 percent of GDP by improving investor 1 Throughout this paper, a distinction is made between loans from MDBs, and flows from the IMF. Thus, multilateral flows refer to loans from MDBs (including the World Bank and regional development banks)
to developing countries as defined in World Bank's Global Development Finance reports.
confidence and public services such as education and infrastructure (World Bank 1998 p 40, Dollar and Easterly 1998) . These authors also found that a 1 percent of GDP in aid reduced private investment by 0.5 percent in developing countries with poor policies. Since the relationship between domestic private investment rate and private capital flows from abroad to a developing country is likely to be positive, this finding implies some degree of crowding-out of private flows by multilateral flows in poor-management countries.
Several studies, on the other hand, did not find any evidence that multilateral lending encouraged private flows. Rodrik (1995) found that the relationship between private flows and lagged multilateral lending was negative (though not significant) during 1970-93. He also found that multilateral flows-especially IMF flows-tended to follow private flows, raising the possibility of "bailing-out" of private investors, as also argued by Dooley (1994) and Killick (1995a) . (Somewhat surprisingly, and consistent with the results reported later, Rodrik also found that some multilateral flows, especially the non-concessional flows from IBRD, tended to improve the growth potential of the recipient country.) Dasgupta and Ratha (2000) noted that the decline in the World Bank's (long-term) investment lending in recent years was due to the increase in private foreign direct investment (project finance in particular), whereas its (relatively shorter-term) adjustment lending was strongly counter-cyclical with respect to private non-FDI flows. They argued that such negative relationship was a reflection of a passive "stabilizing" role played by multilateral agencies in response to volatile private flows: the demand for official flows declined when private flows became available, and increased when private investors withdrew, especially during financial crises. Lerrick (1999) , in a background paper prepared for the Meltzer Commission Report on
International Financial Institutions, argued that multilateral flows were replacing private flows, especially in emerging market economies.
Some authors have pointed out other reasons for expecting a negative relationship between multilateral flows and private capital flows to developing countries (although not all of them would imply "crowding-out" of the latter by the former). Private flows may be discouraged if multilateral lending programs somehow created incentives for borrowing governments to delay reforms necessary for growth and poverty reduction (Easterly 2000 , Svensson 2000 . Multilateral lending may be "fungible" in the sense that it may enable governments to undertake low-quality projects or programs (Devarajan and Swaroop 2000) , or such loans may be used for servicing old debt, thus reducing the "additionality" of such lending (Ratha 2001 , Birdsall et al. 2001 , Devarajan et al. 1999 ).
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In the context of this debate, this paper examines the trends in private flows and multilateral flows to developing countries, using data from 1970 to 1998, to first establish whether there is indeed a negative or counter-cyclical relationship between these flows; and second, to show that even when some degree of counter-cyclicality existed, that need not imply "crowding-out" of private flows to developing countries. Indeed short-term counter-cyclicality and medium-term complementarity between multilateral flows and private flows to developing countries can co-exist. The argument runs as follows: Let us assume that both multilateral and private flows consist of two components-one responsive to structural, policy and institutional environment, and the other to cyclical factors (for example, an increase in GDP growth rate or an interest rate hike in the industrial countries). Both private and official flows respond positively to structural factors. With respect to the cyclical variables, however, private flows tend to behave 3 Killick (1995b) argued that multilateral lending may suffer from a moral hazard problem: since the preferred creditor status of the MDBs ensures that even ill-advised loans get serviced first, multilateral lending may end up financing low-quality projects or programs. Faini et al. (1991) also found a negative correlation between lending by international financial institutions and net private credit. See also Bird and Rowlands (1997) .
pro-cyclically whereas official flows are expected to react counter-cyclically. In addition, official flows may (arguably) lead to an improvement in the structural, policy and institutional environment of a country in the medium-to long-run. Thus, official flows would tend to be counter-cyclical to private flows in the concurrent period; but these would tend to complement private flows with a time lag by signaling-and often fostering-a better investment environment.
The main findings of this paper are:
• Although private flows to developing countries surged in the 1990s, multilateral loans continue to be a significant source of external finance in most low-income and lower middle-income countries. Even in the upper middle-income countries receiving the lion's share of private flows, multilateral lending has played an important stabilizing role during financial crises.
• In recent years multilateral lending played a counter-cyclical or stabilizing role vis-à-vis private flows as the demand for official borrowing rose during times of credit rationing. Multilateral lending also complemented private flows with a time lag by signaling-and often fostering-a better investment environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses trends in multilateral flows vis-à-vis private flows to show that multilateral flows remain an important source of external finance in many developing countries. This section also shows that the relationship between multilateral flows and private flows to developing countries has been counter-cyclical in recent years, but it was not always so in the 1970s and early 1980s. Section 3 develops a simple framework for examining the cyclical and structural aspects of the relationship between multilateral and private flows to developing countries. Section 4 contains empirical results. The concluding section summarizes the results and indicates areas of future research.
Trends in multilateral and private flows to developing countries
The importance of multilateral flows
At their peak in 1996, private flows to developing countries were more than ten times the volume of official flows, and nearly 11 times that of multilateral flows. After a series of crises However, an examination of the 1970s does not reveal any strong counter-cyclicality between private and official flows. Indeed, further disaggregation of data reveals that a countercyclical relationship between non-concessional multilateral flows (i.e., multilateral lending to middle-income countries) and private flows did not begin until the onset of the 1980s' debt crisis (and, interestingly, the introduction of adjustment lending in the World Bank) (figure 3).
As mentioned earlier, such counter-cyclical relationship observed in recent years has been interpreted by some studies as evidence that multilateral flows either did not affect, or discouraged private flows. However, this relationship evident from the macro data does not take into account the effects of relevant variables such as the income level, market access, growth performance, and population size. It also does not distinguish between short-term cyclical and long-term structural relationships between multilateral and private flows. A simple framework to account for these factors and related results from multivariate regressions is presented in the next two sections.
A simple framework of counter-cyclicality and complementarity between multilateral flows and private capital flows to developing countries
Both private capital flows and multilateral lending may be thought of as consisting of two components-one responsive to structural, policy and institutional environment in the recipient country, and the other to cyclical factors (for example, an increase in GDP growth rate in the recipient country or an interest rate hike in the industrial countries).
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Both private and multilateral flows are expected to respond positively to the former set of factors. 9 With respect to cyclical variables, however, private flows may respond pro-cyclically whereas multilateral lending is expected to react counter-cyclically. Thus, we postulate:
where P t indicates private capital flows and M t indicates multilateral lending to a developing country at time t. I stands for country policy and institutional performance while C stands for cyclical factors. The coefficients a, b, m and n are assumed to be strictly positive.
Additionally, multilateral lending may lead to an improvement in policy and institutions over time, which would imply an equation of the type:
Manipulating (1) and (2) yields:
Equations (4) and (5) imply an inverse relationship between private capital flows and multilateral lending. These equations also imply a positive relationship between private flows and the policy and institutional performance indicator.
Using (3) in (4) yields: 
Empirical results
The postulated relationship between private capital flows and multilateral lending can be readily tested by estimating c 1 and c 2 in equation (6). For this purpose, we have used a framework similar to Rodrik (1995) . A panel data set was constructed for all 137 developing countries for which World Bank (2000) reported capital flows during 1970-98. Period averages were constructed from annual data for 1970-75, 1976-81, 1982-87, 1988-93 and 1994-98 
where A it is a vector of period-specific and country-specific dummies (fixed effects), X it is vector of control variables including log of population size, log of per capita GNP, GDP growth rate;
and e it is error term. The subscripts i and t refer respectively to country and time period.
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A practical problem in estimating this equation (6) (2000) is that private FDI and non-FDI flows relate counter-cyclically to IBRD commitments in the same year, but positively to the IBRD commitments with a one year lag. 15 The coefficient for the current multilateral flow variable is found to be positive (and not significant) in the lower middle-income countries, weakly indicating an absence of counter-cyclicality between multilateral lending and private flows even in the concurrent period. This result may mean that the signaling effect on private flows worked faster than the six-year lag assumed here, or that the use of sixyear averages dampened the cyclical effects on private and official flows.
IMF flows did not seem to affect private flows to the lower middle-income countries during 1994-98, but these flows had significant positive effects on private flows in low-income countries, both with and without lags. This is somewhat understandable because in IMF loans tend to have shorter terms in middle-income countries than in low-income countries. 16 In contrast to multilateral flows which seem to affect private flows with a time lag, bilateral flows (including grants) 17 seem to have a significant and positive effect on private flows in the concurrent period, but a negative effect with a lag. This result may reflect the importance of strategic and noneconomic considerations in aid allocation by bilateral donors (Alesina and Dollar 1998) .
The marginal (medium-term) impact on a country's share in private flows when its share in multilateral flows rises by one percentage point can be estimated from the coefficient d in equation (7) percentage points from 0.032 percent-a nearly three times increase in private portfolio share, and a significantly higher effect than in lower middle-income countries.
The results presented above should be treated with some caution. It is important to bear in mind that multilateral flows are only one, and perhaps not the best, among a number of 16 Several studies reviewed in Bird and Rowlands (1997) , including their own empirical investigation, reported that the results on the catalytic effects of IMF flows on private flows to developing countries were inconclusive if not negative.
variables that influence private capital flows to a developing country. Also, these regressions suffer from negative serial correlation, although as mentioned earlier, this is to be expected owing to the lead-lag relationship between private-official-private relationships postulated here.
Conclusion
Official The analysis above ignores the effects of the policy environment in the recipient country as well as the external economic environment. As has been noted in the literature, aid works better in a good policy environment Burnside 1999, Collier and Dollar 1999) . We have partially captured the effect of good policies through the growth and per capita income variables, but an explicit treatment of policy performance would be useful. Also our analysis does not take into account the fact that the relationship between multilateral flows and private flows may depend on what multilateral loans finance in the recipient country, and how these loans are financed. 19 If, for example, multilateral loans are used for debt service payments, the impact on private flows may be weakened (Ratha 2001 , Easterly 2000 . Again, for example, financing multilateral loans by borrowing from the domestic capital market in emerging market economies may weaken the impact on private flows. 4 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 0.5 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 - These cross-country regressions use averages of variables for the periods 1970-75, 1976-81, 1982-87, 1988-93, and 1994-98 (as applicable) . Each variable is expressed as a share of country GDP. For example, MULTg = MULT/ GDP and so on. A constant term and dummies for severely-indebted low-income countries (SILIC), severely indebted middle-income countries (SIMIC), moderately-indebted low-income countries (MILIC) and moderately-indebted middle-income countries (MIMIC) as defined in GDF 2000, and also period dummies for 1982-87, 1988-93 and 1994-98 were also included in these regressions (as applicable), but not shown here. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Table 3 ) is shown as the marginal impact.
